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1.  Introduction
The control of externalities is a complex second-best problem.  The first-best
prescription, following Pigou (1920), is to set marginal taxes and subsidies equal to marginal
external harms and benefits.  Because of the preexisting distortion due to labor income taxation,
however, researchers have explored how the Pigouvian rule needs to be modified on account of
the interaction between environmental regulation and the income tax, particularly concerning the
need to raise revenue and the indirect effects of environmental policy on labor supply.  Work
began in the 1970s with Sandmo (1975) and others, following the growing interest in optimal
taxation more generally.  Subsequently, researchers became interested in the possibility of a
double dividend – that corrective taxation might both enhance welfare by internalizing
externalities and also raise revenue that would allow a reduction in distortionary income
taxation.  See, for example, Ballard and Medema (1993), Cordes, Nicholson, and Sammartino
(1990), and Pearce (1991).  This work, in turn, led to an extensive modern literature on
environmental regulation, much of which suggests that there is no double dividend and, instead,
that optimal environmental control may well fall short of the Pigouvian first best.  For a survey
and a collection of literature, see respectively Bovenberg and Goulder (2002) and Goulder
(2002).
An additional second-best problem involves distribution.  See, for example, Casler and
Rafiqui (1993) and West (2004).  Because many proposed correctives, such as heightened
taxation of gasoline, are believed to be regressive and, moreover, environmental benefits may
have values that rise (perhaps disproportionately) with income, distributive concerns seem
potentially important.  Indeed, Pigou (1928) himself argued that distributive effects needed to be
taken into account in assessing corrective taxes and subsidies.
This article seeks to advance our understanding of the regulation of externalities by
examining the problem in what seems to be a natural and foundational setting in light of work on
taxation more generally: namely, in a model in which there can be taxes or subsidies on each
commodity and a nonlinear income tax, and in which individuals differ in their earning abilities. 
Specifically, the question addressed is, in a world in which there may be externalities, what
reforms of commodity taxes and subsidies can generate Pareto improvements, beginning with
any arbitrary initial system.  By including a preexisting income tax – with no restriction on how
it is set initially – interactions involving tax revenue and labor supply are addressed.  And by
focusing on Pareto improvements, concerns about distribution are taken into account.
The principle result is that, in a standard, simple setting (specifically, in which utility is
weakly separable in labor), it is possible to move from any set of commodity taxes and subsidies
to first-best Pigouvian taxes and subsidies – wherein each tax or subsidy equals marginal harm
or benefit – in a manner that generates a Pareto improvement.  In particular, this result arises
when the income tax is adjusted such that the reform as a whole is distribution neutral.  An
extension shows that, subject to some additional assumptions, any marginal change in
commodity taxes and subsidies that is proportionally in the direction of the first best produces a
Pareto improvement if a distribution-neutral income tax adjustment is employed.  In addition, a
necessary and sufficient condition is offered that indicates which other commodity tax reforms
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make possible Pareto improvements.  The article also addresses how relaxing distribution
neutrality and weak separability affects the results and discusses how these assumptions explain
differences from prior work.
Before proceeding, it is useful to relate the present analysis and results to two additional
strands of literature.  The first pertains to the method of proof employed here, which as
mentioned involves an adjustment to the preexisting income tax such that the reform as a whole
is distribution neutral.  This approach follows Hylland and Zeckhauser (1979), Kaplow (1996),
and some subsequent work that focuses on public goods.  Kaplow (1996, 2004, 2008) has
discussed informally the application of this approach to the regulation of externalities; the
contribution of the present article is to analyze the problem formally, offer extensions, and relate
the results to existing literature on environmental regulation.  When distribution-neutral income
tax adjustments are utilized, distributive concerns are obviously taken into account, and it
becomes possible to characterize Pareto improvements.  Furthermore, as will be explained, when
reforms are implemented in this distribution-neutral manner, labor supply is unaffected in a
baseline case; hence, concerns about second-best interactions with the preexisting income tax
also become moot.  Accordingly, there is an important sense in which the concerns about labor
supply and distribution that have occupied much of the second-best literature on externalities are
independent of the question of how best to control externalities.
The present investigation can also be related to the literature on optimal commodity
taxation in the presence of an income tax.  The seminal analysis of this model – for the case in
which there are no externalities – is provided by Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976), who examine
optimal commodity taxation when the income tax is also set optimally.  They find that, with
weak labor separability, uniform commodity taxation (equivalent to no commodity taxation) is
optimal.  A way to understand their result is to realize that, with the separability assumption,
differential commodity taxation cannot help to reduce the labor-leisure distortion due to labor
income taxation; hence, its only effect is to distort consumption allocations.  Accordingly, it is
optimal for commodity price ratios to equal the corresponding ratios of social resource costs,
which in their model consist solely of production costs.  In the present setting, social resource
costs include externalities, so the natural extension of their finding is that price ratios should
equal the ratios of the sum of production costs and external effects, which is precisely what
obtains if one follows Pigou’s (1920) prescription by setting commodity taxes and subsidies
equal to marginal external harms and benefits.
The article formalizes this intuition, thereby extending Atkinson and Stiglitz’s (1976)
important result to settings with externalities.  Furthermore, the analysis here is not restricted to
cases in which the income tax is optimal and is not limited to commodity tax reforms in the
neighborhood of their optimum.1  In these two respects, the present results are most analogous to
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those in Kaplow’s (2006) recent article on commodity taxation.  See also Laroque (2005) and
Kaplow (2008).  Nevertheless, the bulk of the analysis here is different precisely because of the
presence of externalities.  Furthermore, it is difficult to view the present results – however
intuitively plausible they may seem on reflection – as obvious when most existing literature on
externalities appears to advance qualitatively different prescriptions.  Formal analysis is
necessary to understand when and why the conclusions from various models diverge and to
assess the implications of the difference in approaches.
2.  Optimality of First-Best Pigouvian Taxes and Subsidies
2.1.  Model
Individuals earn income y, which is equal to wl, the product of their wage w and their
labor effort l.  Wages (types) are distributed according to the density function f(w).  The
government imposes a (nonlinear) income tax T(y).  As is standard, the government observes
income but does not separately observe individuals’ wages or choices of labor effort.
Individuals spend their after-income-tax income, y ! T(y), on n commodities, x1, ..., xn. 
Commodity prices for the xi (which equal production costs) are denoted pi and are assumed to be
positive constants.  There are also commodity taxes on each xi of τi (which may be subsidies, in
which case they are negative).  Individuals thus face net prices of pi + τi.
An individual of type w’s choice of labor l is equivalent to a choice of income y that will
be denoted y(w).  For the chosen level of income, and taking the tax system (and the level of
externalities, see below) as given, the individual chooses how much to expend on each
commodity, xi(y(w)).  The individual’s budget constraint can thus be written as
( ) ( ) ( ( )) ( ) ( ( )),1 p x y w y w T y wi i i+ = −∑ τ
where summations throughout are from i equals 1 to n.  
Each commodity xi is associated with an externality ei, which denotes the total
consumption by all individuals of that commodity:
( ) ( ( )) ( ) .2 e x y w f w dwi i= ∫
When individuals choose y(w) and the xi(y(w))’s, they are assumed to take the ei as given (which
is appropriate since there is a continuum of individuals, each of measure zero).
Individuals’ utility functions are u(v(x1, ..., xn, e1, ..., en), l), where v is a subutility
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function.  This utility function is assumed to be continuously differentiable, strictly concave,
increasing in commodities, and decreasing in labor effort.  Utility may have any relationship to
the levels of the ei’s; that is, the external effect due to each of the commodities may be positive,
negative, or nonexistent.  This form of the utility function, with the subutility function v, entails
what is referred to as weak separability of labor (or leisure): For a given level of after-income-
tax income, individuals will allocate their disposable income among commodities in the same
manner regardless of the level of labor effort required to earn that level of income; furthermore,
in choosing labor effort, it does not matter what levels of consumption and externalities combine
to produce a given level of subutility v.
In the analysis that follows, use will be made of the indirect subutility function V(τ, T, y),
which is the value of v(x1, ..., xn, e1, ..., en), maximized over the xi’s, where the commodity tax
vector τ, the income tax schedule T, and before-tax income y (as well as the ei’s) are taken as
given.  Observe that since v depends only on the xi’s (and the ei’s), and since the budget
constraint (1) depends only on the xi’s, τ, T, and y – and not on w or l independently – the
indirect subutility function V is the same for all individuals, regardless of their type w.  It will
also be useful to use this indirect subutility function to define U(τ, T, w, l) = u(V(τ, T, y), l).
The government’s budget constraint is
[ ]( ) ( ( )) ( ( )) ( ) ,3 T y w x y w f w dw Ri i+ =∑∫ τ
where R is a given revenue requirement.
Finally, the marginal external harm associated with any commodity is
( )
( ) ( )
( )
( ) ,4 h
u w v w
w
f w dwi
v ei= − ∫ λ
where subscripts indicate partial derivatives, the notation (w) indicates evaluation for an
individual of type w, and λ(w) refers to the Lagrange multiplier (for individuals of type w),
which signifies the marginal utility of disposable income.  The fraction in the integrand,
therefore, is the marginal effect of the externality on utility divided by the marginal utility of
disposable income, which denotes the marginal external effect for a given type w, measured in
dollars.  Note that for positive externalities, hi < 0.  Now we can define:
First-best Pigouvian taxes and subsidies.  A commodity tax vector {τ1, ..., τn} consists of
first-best Pigouvian taxes and subsidies if and only if (pi+τi)/(pj+τj) = (pi+hi)/(pj+hj), for all i, j.
Notice that the definition does not require that τi = hi, for all i.  The reason has to do with
normalization: If all commodity taxes are raised or lowered in such a manner as to leave all
consumer price ratios unchanged, individuals’ behavior will be unaffected – if the level of the
income tax is also adjusted to produce the same effective disposable income.  (This point is
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analogous to the familiar idea that uniform commodity taxes are equivalent to a proportional
adjustment to the income tax.)
2.2.  Analysis
The approach is to begin with any regime that does not consist of first-best Pigouvian
taxes and subsidies and then to construct a regime with first-best Pigouvian taxes and subsidies
that makes everyone better off.  As an intermediate step in analyzing any reform (not necessarily
a move to the social optimum), say, from tax regime {τ, T} to regime {τ*, T*}, it is useful to
examine the intermediate income tax schedule T° that has the property that each individual’s
utility under {τ*, T°} is the same as that under {τ, T} if the individual continues to choose the
same level of labor effort l.  (Whether individuals will choose the same labor effort under this
intermediate regime is the subject of Lemma 1, below.)
To be more precise, define T°(y) such that V(τ, T, y) = V(τ*, T°, y) for all y.  In general, a
reform from τ to τ* will, for a given y, change the value of subutility V.  For each y, the tax
schedule T°(y) is set at the level that restores the original level of subutility (by changing after-
tax income for the stipulated level of before-tax income).  This tax adjustment, T°(y)!T(y), is
simply the schedule of utility-compensating changes in disposable income.  Given how the
intermediate income tax schedule is constructed, it is possible to establish the following result.
Lemma 1: Every type of individual w chooses the same level of labor effort under
{τ*, T°} as under {τ, T}.
Proof: It is straightforward to establish that U(τ, T, w, l) = u(V(τ, T, y), l) =
u(V(τ*, T°, y), l) = U(τ*, T°, w, l), for all w, l.  The first equality follows by the definition of U. 
The second equality follows because T°(y) is constructed such that V(τ, T, y) = V(τ*,  T°, y) for
all y.  And the third equality also follows from the definition of U.  Therefore, U(τ, T, w, l) =
U(τ*, T°, w, l), for all w, l.  Because, for any type w, this equality holds for all l, the level of
utility an individual achieves for each possible choice of l is the same in each of the two regimes. 
Therefore, for each type w, whatever l maximizes U in the initial regime {τ, T}  must be the l
that maximizes U in the intermediate regime {τ*, T°}.
The intuition is as follows: The first part of the lemma merely shows the obvious point
that, if the subutility V is unchanged for every y and thus for every choice of l (which is true by
construction), then indeed U is unchanged for every choice of l.  The second part of the lemma
simply observes that since U as a function of l is unchanged when moving from {τ, T} to
{τ*, T°}, the choice of l that maximizes U is likewise unchanged.  This result that labor supply is
unaffected greatly simplifies the analysis of any tax reform, including those of particular interest
here.
To begin the construction of a Pareto-improving tax reform, start with an initial regime
{τ, T} that is not a Pigouvian first best (as defined above).  For simplicity, choose from among
the multitude of equivalent first-best Pigouvian tax systems the one for which τi* = hi, for all i. 
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For purposes of the argument to follow, it will be assumed that the hi’s are constant and thus
independent of the xi’s and the ei’s.  (The more general case will be commented on below.) 
Moving to this new commodity tax vector will tend to change individuals’ utilities on account of
three effects: changes in the payment and receipt of commodity taxes and subsidies, changes in
consumption due to the new relative price vector, and changes in externalities on account of
others’ changes in consumption.  Whatever is the net effect on utility for any type w and given
labor effort for that type, we will consider the intermediate income tax schedule T°(y), defined
above, that offsets the net effect on utility at each income level.
We know that from Lemma 1 that moving to this intermediate regime leaves labor supply
unchanged.  The next question to consider is how revenue compares between the initial regime
and the intermediate regime.
Lemma 2: If the hi’s are constant, then regime {τ*, T°} (with first-best Pigouvian taxes
and subsidies τi* = hi, for all i) raises more revenue than does regime {τ, T} (without first-best
Pigouvian taxes and subsidies).
Proof: To begin, we can see from expression (3) that the change in revenue is given by
( ) ( )[ ]( ) ( ( )) ( ( )) ( * ) ( ( )) * ( ( )) ( ( )) ( ) .5 T y w T y w x y w x y w x y w f w dwi i i i i i° − + − + ° −∑∑∫ τ τ τ
The first term in the integrand is the change in income tax revenue for an individual of type w,
who earns y(w), from moving to the intermediate regime.  The next two terms are the change in
commodity tax revenue for the individual, which is decomposed for convenience: The second
term is the revenue change from moving to the first-best Pigouvian commodity tax vector,
holding constant the original level of consumption, and the third term is the revenue change from
the individual’s adjustment in consumption, evaluated using the new commodity tax vector, x°. 
These three terms are integrated over the population to yield the total change in revenue.
In analyzing expression (5), it is useful to decompose the first term, the change in income
tax revenue, by imagining that the shift to the intermediate regime occurs in three stages:
1. The commodity tax reform is introduced but the xi’s are imagined to be held
constant, and the T(y) schedule is adjusted to hold individuals at the same utility
levels taking into account that commodity tax payments are changed – the second
term in expression (5).  Let T1°(y) denote the resulting income tax schedule.
2. Individuals adjust their xi’s but the ei’s are imagined to be held constant, and the
T(y) schedule is further modified, to T2°(y), for the effect of these adjustments on
individuals’ own levels of utility.
3. The ei’s are allowed to reflect the new level of the xi’s (which in turn may be
further adjusted because of the change in the levels of the ei’s, ultimately yielding
the xi°’s), and the T(y) schedule is further modified, now to T°(y).
Using this notation, expression (5) can be rewritten as
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( ) ( ) ( )[ ]
( )[ ]
( ) ( ( )) ( ( )) ( ( )) ( ( )) ( ( )) ( ( )) ( )
( * ) ( ( )) * ( ( )) ( ( )) ( ) .
6 2 2 1 1T y w T y w T y w T y w T y w T y w f w dw
x y w x y w x y w f w dwi i i i i i
° − ° + ° − ° + ° −
+ − + ° −
∫
∑∑∫ τ τ τ
Stage 1:  Beginning with the first stage, in which the xi’s are held constant, the income
tax schedule T(y) for each type w is raised (lowered), to the schedule T1°(y), by an amount equal
to the negative of the fourth term (the first term in line 2) in expression (6), which denotes the
increase (or reduction) in expenditures on commodities necessary to finance a type-w
individual’s original consumption bundle.  Note that, after this adjustment to the income tax,
each type of individual will just be able to afford the original level of consumption.  Because the
increase (decrease) in income tax revenue for each type of individual, T1°(y) ! T(y), precisely
equals the decrease (increase) in commodity tax and subsidy revenue for each, it follows that the
third and fourth terms in (6) are precisely offsetting at each y and thus also when each is
integrated over the population.  Therefore, the net revenue effect with regard to this first stage is
nil.
Stage 2:  Now we move to the second stage and allow individuals to adjust their xi’s, but
we imagine that the ei’s are still held constant.  It will now be demonstrated that there is a
positive revenue effect on account of the change in T(y) necessary to offset the direct effect on
individuals’ utility from their own changes in consumption.  That is, T2°(y) ! T1°(y) > 0 for all y. 
This arises because, in this hypothetical setting, all individuals would wish to change their
consumption, which they would do only if they stood to gain.
To show this result, begin with the fact that an individual’s optimal consumption vector
is determined by standard first-order conditions, which in the initial regime are
(Mv/Mxi)/(Mv/Mxj) = (pi+τi)/(pj+τj), for all i, j.  Given that the commodity taxes in the original
regime are not first-best Pigouvian taxes and subsidies, there exists i, j such that
(pi+τi)/(pj+τj) … (pi+hi)/(pj+hj).  However, the latter term equals (pi+τi*)/(pj+τj*).  Because the
first-order conditions are all satisfied in the initial regime, at least one must therefore be violated
after the commodity tax reform if the consumption bundle is unchanged.  As a consequence, the
consumption vector that was optimal under the original regime cannot be optimal under the
hypothesized intermediate regime.  Now, for individuals thus adjusting their consumption on
account of the change in price ratios, it follows that their utility must be higher under the
intermediate regime unless the income tax schedule is adjusted upwards to reduce their
disposable income.  Of course, precisely this adjustment must be done in the intermediate regime
because T2°(y) is, by definition, constructed so as to hold everyone’s utility constant at the end of
stage 2.  Accordingly, with regard to this second stage, it is indeed true that T2°(y) ! T1°(y) > 0
for all y; that is, the second term in (6) is positive.  The effect of changes in consumption on
commodity tax revenue is considered in combination with stage 3.
Stage 3:  Finally, in the third stage, we allow the ei’s to reflect the new level of the xi’s –
which in turn may be further adjusted on account of the change in the levels of the ei’s,
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ultimately yielding the xi°’s – and we examine what further change in the T(y) schedule, from
T2°(y) to T°(y), is necessary to compensate for this change in the levels of externalities. 
Furthermore, we can compare this income tax revenue effect to the change in commodity tax and
subsidy revenue due to the shifts in consumption, the final term in expression (6).  It will now be
demonstrated that these two effects must offset because the commodity taxes are being used as
corrective taxes (and subsidies), set at the level that internalizes any externalities.
The compensation for all changes in the level of externalities is, as stated, accomplished
by moving the income tax schedule from T2°(y) to T°(y).  The aggregate effect on income tax
revenues is:
( )
( )( ) ( )
( ) ( ( )) ( ( )) ( )
( ) ( )
( )
( ( )) ( ( )) ( ) ( ) .
7 2T y w T y w f w dw
u w v w
w
x y w x y w f w dw f w dw h e ev e i i i i ii
° − °
= ° −⎡
⎣⎢
⎤
⎦⎥
= − °−
∫
∫∫∑ ∑λ
The left side of the second line of expression (7) is the aggregate effect on individuals’ utility
(measured in dollars) due to changes in the level of the externality.  The integrand of the internal
integral is the change in the levels of consumption; integrated over all individuals, this gives the
change in the levels of the externalities, as recorded on the right side.  For a unit change in the
level of any particular externality ei, the integral of the effect on utility, measured in dollars, over
the population equals the negative of the marginal external harm, hi, as stated in expression (4).
Let us compare this revenue effect due to the compensatory adjustment in the income tax
schedule to the final term in expression (6), the change in revenue through the commodity taxes
and subsidies on account of individuals’ changes in consumption.
( )[ ] ( )[ ]
( )
( ) * ( ( )) ( ( )) ( ) ( ( )) ( ( )) ( )
.
8 τ i i i i i i
i i i
x y w x y w f w dw h x y w x y w f w dw
h e e
° − = ° −
= °−
∑ ∫∑∫
∑
The left side of (8) shows that the change in total commodity tax (and subsidy) collections on
account of consumption adjustments equals the integral over the population of each individual’s
change in commodity tax payments due to the shift in consumption in moving from the original
regime to the intermediate regime.  On the right side of (8) in the top line, hi is substituted for τi*
because the τi*’s are defined to be first-best Pigouvian taxes and subsidies (normalized to equal
external harm), and the orders of the summation and integration are reversed for convenience. 
Finally, the move to the second line of (8) reflects, as with expression (7), that the levels of the
externalities are defined as the integral of consumption over the population as a whole.
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Comparing expressions (7) and (8), it is apparent that the amount of revenue lost (gained)
through this third stage in the income tax adjustment – the compensation for externalities –
precisely equals the revenue gain (loss) through commodity taxes – which are now set at first-
best Pigouvian levels – on account of individuals adjusting their levels of consumption. 
Therefore, the first and last terms in expression (6) offset.
Summarizing, from the third stage, the first and last terms in (6) offset; from the first
stage, the third and fourth terms in (6) offset; and, from the second stage, the second term in (6)
is positive.  Therefore, it has been demonstrated that expression (6) is positive.
The intuition behind this proof is as follows.  For stage 1, the only effects are on taxes
(behavior is held constant); hence, to keep each individual at the same level of utility, it must be
that the first component of the intermediate income tax adjustment just offsets the effect of the
commodity tax reform, at each level of income.  (For example, if the reform makes individuals at
a given income y spend more because taxes on commodities causing negative externalities are
higher, it must be that income taxes at income y are reduced accordingly so that individuals can
afford the same consumption bundle.)  This stage obviously is revenue neutral.  In stage 2,
individuals are adjusting their xi’s and everything else is held constant, except for the second
component of the income tax adjustment.  Because individuals necessarily increase their utility
when they voluntarily choose to change their consumption, the income tax adjustment that holds
utility constant must reduce their disposable income and therefore raise revenue.  Finally, the
stage 3 income tax adjustment that compensates for externalities just offsets the change in
commodity tax revenue due to changes in consumption.  The basic reason is that commodity
taxes now equal marginal external effects, so they collect (expend) an amount equal to marginal
harm (benefit) from consumption adjustments, which in turn equals the amount that income tax
collections must fall (rise) to offset the effect of the change in externalities on individuals’
utilities.
To complete the argument that a Pareto improvement is possible in moving to first-best
Pigouvian taxes and subsidies, construct T*(y) from T°(y) by performing two operations
simultaneously: Gradually rebate the surplus pro rata, and, as individuals adjust their levels of
consumption, adjust the income tax schedule in order to offset the effects on utility of changes in
the levels of externalities, as described in the proof of Lemma 2 regarding stage 3.  As with stage
3, this latter operation is revenue neutral when one combines the revenue effects from the
income tax adjustment with those from consumption adjustments changing the level of
commodity tax receipts.  The former operation (raising the rebate) will ultimately exhaust the
surplus.  Moreover – and of central importance to the present argument – the effect from this
operation is that all individuals’ utility will increase.2
At this point, we have constructed a new income tax schedule, to accompany the move to
first-best Pigouvian taxes and subsidies, such that every type of individual is strictly better off,
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thereby establishing the following result:
Proposition 1: If the hi’s are constant, then for any tax system {τ, T} for which
commodity taxes and subsidies are not at first-best Pigouvian levels, there exists a tax system
{τ*, T*} with first-best Pigouvian taxes and subsidies that is strictly Pareto superior – i.e., 
U(τ*, T*, w, l(w)) > U(τ, T, w, l(w)), for all w.
The role of the assumption that the hi’s are constant and thus independent of the xi’s and
the ei’s in the proof pertains to stage 3 in Lemma 2 and to the rebate process.  These arguments
rely on the fact that – with τi’s that have been set equal to the hi’s – changes in commodity tax
and subsidy payments due to changes in consumption are necessarily equal to changes in the
level of external harm and benefit due to those same changes in consumption.  If one allows the
hi’s to be endogenous, one would need to modify the argument by employing a continuous
adjustment process, roughly as follows.  Initially, reform the τi’s to equal the hi’s at the existing
level of the xi’s.  Then, (hypothetically) allow the xi’s to adjust gradually.  One can then perform
all of the pertinent operations used in the proof of Lemma 2 and in the rebate process, but in each
case with the level of the τi’s being continuously adjusted as the xi’s change so that, at every
point, the τi’s equal the hi’s.  For each increment of these marginal changes, the preceding
analysis applies.  Hence, once the adjustment considered in Lemma 2 is complete, the net effect
on revenue will be the integral of positive marginal changes due to the stage 2 income tax
adjustments – all other effects netting to zero as before – so revenue will necessarily increase. 
Likewise, the rebate process can be implemented as before, subject to further adjustment of the
τi’s.  Also note that, because in all phases of the construction the τi’s are set equal to the hi’s,
when the construction is complete the system {τ*, T*} will indeed be one that has first-best
Pigouvian taxes and subsidies.  (Finally, observe that the endogeneity of the hi’s would be moot
if we were considering only local changes near the Pigouvian first best.)
It is useful to remark on the intuition underlying Proposition 1.  Any direct effects of the
move to first-best Pigouvian taxes and subsidies on individuals’ budget constraints can be offset
by an income tax adjustment, after which individuals can continue to afford their original
consumption bundle.  Given that price ratios have changed, individuals will want to change their
levels of consumption, and the direct effect of such adjustments on the individuals who make
them is utility increasing (for otherwise they would not have chosen to alter their consumption). 
External effects of these changes in consumption are fully compensated through further
adjustments to the income tax schedule, and this compensation is fully funded by changes in
receipts from the commodity taxes and subsidies, each of which equals the pertinent marginal
external effect.  Hence, just as in a world in which there is fixed labor supply – or simply
endowments of goods and no labor decision – and no redistributive, distortionary income tax, all
individuals can be made better off by the complete internalization of externalities.
Distribution and labor supply effects do not interfere with the argument because the
income tax schedule is adjusted to keep them fixed.  The intermediate tax schedule (before the
rebate, which makes everyone better off) keeps everyone’s utility constant; hence, there are no
distributive effects to consider.  Moreover, as explained in proving Lemma 1, when this is done,
the return to any choice of labor effort, for individuals of any type w, is the same, so individuals
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will be induced to keep their labor supply unchanged.  Thus, in the present construction, the
income tax problem – involving the tradeoff of distribution and labor supply distortion – is
independent of the problem of controlling externalities, so the solution to the latter problem has
its familiar first-best character.
3.  Extensions
3.1.  Reforms other than to First-Best Pigouvian Taxes and Subsidies
When reformed commodity taxes and subsidies do not all equal the level of marginal
external harm or benefit, the change in commodity tax revenue due to shifts in consumption need
not be sufficient to finance the compensation for the change in the levels of the externalities
provided by the stage 3 income tax adjustment.  Consider first reforms that move proportionately
toward the first-best commodity tax regime.  Specifically, beginning with an income tax T(y) and
an initial set of τi’s that are not first-best Pigouvian taxes and subsidies, such a reform can be
described formally as a move to τi(α)  = αhi + (1!α)τi, for all i, where α 0 [0, 1].  Furthermore,
because the hi are themselves endogenous, being influenced by changes in α, consider the
marginal reform dτi(α)/dα, for all i, evaluated at α = 0.  For the income tax adjustment, we can
define the income tax schedule T(y,α) that changes as a function of α so as to keep utility
constant at every level of income and thus for every type.
Because increasing α moves in the direction of the first best, changes in consumption
tend to be desirable.  Individuals will tend to consume less of commodities that are underpriced
(for example, those with undercorrected negative externalities) because those prices will rise,
and individuals will tend to consume more of overpriced commodities (overcorrected negative
externalities and undercorrected positive externalities) because those prices will fall.  There is,
however, a qualification due to possible cross-effects.  To illustrate, suppose that initially all
commodity taxes are zero and only two goods involve externalities.  Flowers produce a positive
externality (to those driving by), and driving, corresponding, say, to the commodity gasoline,
produces a negative externality (pollution).  The reform would provide a small subsidy to
flowers and impose a small tax on gasoline.  Suppose, however, that driving and the positive
externality produced by flowers are highly complementary.  Then the increase in flowers might
induce individuals to increase driving – that is, the effect due to the complementarity might
exceed the contrary effect due to the tax on gasoline.  Additionally, if this increase is sufficiently
great, it is possible that the reform will be inefficient.  A sufficient condition that rules out this
possibility is M2v/MejMxi = 0, for all i, j.
One further complication is that the pro rata rebate of the revenue surplus could actually
make individuals worse off rather than better off when there are uncorrected negative
externalities.  (In such a situation, it would tend to be optimal for the government to impose a
tax, such as a uniform lump-sum tax, and destroy the proceeds.)  To set this problem aside,
assume that “more is better for everyone,” specifically, that if the government finds itself with a
surplus, there exists some manner of rebating it to the population (not necessarily pro rata, given
that externalities may affect individuals earning different levels of income differently) that
produces a Pareto improvement.
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Although the analysis of this case turns out to be more involved than that which
establishes Proposition 1, it is possible to demonstrate the following result (which is proved in
the Appendix):
Proposition 2: If M2v/MejMxi = 0, for all i, j, and if “more is better for everyone,” then for
any tax system {τ, T} for which commodity taxes and subsidies are not at first-best Pigouvian
levels, for a marginal increase in α, evaluated at α = 0, where τi(α) = αhi + (1!α)τi, for all i, there
exists T(y,α) such that the marginal reform is strictly Pareto improving – i.e.,
dU(τ(α), T(y(w),α), w, l(w))/dα*α=0 > 0, for all w.
It is more difficult to characterize reforms that do not move proportionally toward the
first best.  Taking a simple reform, it is familiar that moving a single tax or subsidy in the
direction of the first-best need not be efficient.  For example, raising a tax that was previously
too low may cause substitution to another good whose tax was also too low, perhaps to an even
greater extent.  Nevertheless, it turns out that there is a conceptually simple, if not always easy to
apply, test of when a Pareto improvement is possible.  This test involves a narrow, traditional
concept of efficiency.
Efficiency-increasing commodity tax reform.  For any tax system {τ, T}, a commodity tax
reform τ* is efficiency increasing if, when combined with the intermediate income tax schedule
T°(y) as defined previously,
( ) ( ( )) ( ) ( ( )) ( ) .9 p x y w f w dw p x y w f w dwi i i i° <∫∑ ∫∑
Expression (9) states that the total real resource cost of everyone’s consumption vectors
in the intermediate regime is less than the total real resource cost in the initial regime.  Because
everyone’s utility is the same in these two regimes, this condition indicates that the intermediate
regime is more efficient with regard to consumption choices in a narrow, conventional sense –
i.e., when concerns with the labor-leisure distortion and distribution are ignored.  Note that this
condition makes no explicit reference to externalities; externalities are relevant, however,
because the extent of positive and negative externalities will affect the level of consumption
necessary to bring individuals to the same level of utility as in the initial regime.  It is
straightforward to demonstrate the following (which is proved in the Appendix):
Proposition 3: If “more is better for everyone,” then beginning with any tax system
{τ, T}, for any efficiency-increasing commodity tax reform τ*, there exists T*(y) such that the
reform regime is strictly Pareto superior – i.e., U(τ*, T*, w, l(w)) > U(τ, T, w, l(w)), for all w.
In essence, Proposition 3 states that, if a commodity tax reform increases efficiency in a
traditional sense – that is, if it increases surplus in a world in which labor supply is constant,
tantamount to a world with fixed labor supply or simply one in which initial wealth endowments
are given – then the reform will be desirable, indeed strictly Pareto improving, when combined
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with an appropriate income tax adjustment, even in a world in which labor supply is not constant
and there exists a distortionary labor income tax.  This final proposition reinforces the sense in
which the environmental tax problem and the income tax problem can be viewed as independent
(given the assumption of weak separability).
3.2.  Non-Distribution-Neutral Income Tax Adjustment
The foregoing results assume that the intermediate income tax adjustment holds utility
fixed, which necessarily entails that it is distribution neutral (in terms of utilities).  This
subsection considers the implications of relaxing this assumption and also comments on how
deviations from distribution neutrality explain some (but not all) of the difference between the
present results and those in the pertinent literature.
Distributive effects may have three sources.  The first is the incidence of commodity tax
changes.  The direct effect in terms of commodity taxes paid and subsidies received may depend
on income (and thus type and utility) due to differing aggregate consumption and differing
relative consumption; likewise, the utility effect from adjustments to private consumption may
vary with income.  Second, the benefits of controlling externalities may vary with income.  (As
elaborated further below, note that even if these benefits are additively separable in utility, the
benefits when measured in dollars will rise with income – and, in general, nonlinearly,
depending on the rate of change in the marginal utility of consumption.)  Third, the income tax
adjustment can in principle take any form.  This article constructs the third to just offset the first
two in terms of effects on utility.  When this is not done, the overall result will not be
distribution neutral.3
Fortunately, the analysis of non-distribution-neutral income tax adjustments is
conceptually straightforward, which can be seen by the following decomposition: (1) Implement
the commodity tax reform using the distribution-neutral income tax adjustment specified
previously.  (2) Instantly thereafter, implement a further reform of the income tax, from the
distribution-neutral adjustment of step 1 to whatever (non-distribution-neutral) income tax
adjustment one wishes to consider.
The analysis of step 1 is that presented previously.  To complete the analysis of the non-
distribution-neutral reform, one needs to examine step 2.  Observe that this second step is a
purely redistributive adjustment to the income tax, and accordingly it would be analyzed as such. 
For example, if the initial regime is close to the redistributive optimum and the reform is small,
then it is approximately true that no further adjustment to the welfare analysis should be required
because at the optimum the distribution-distortion tradeoff is a wash.  If instead the reform, say,
increased redistribution and the status quo redistributed too little, then there would be a further
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welfare gain, whereas if the status quo redistributed too much, there would be an associated
welfare loss.  Note that in these latter cases, there would still be partial offsets: For example, if
redistribution becomes even more excessive, the incremental distortion would overstate the
welfare loss because there would still be some welfare gain from the additional redistribution.
This discussion illuminates some of the existing literature.  The explanation may not be
immediately apparent because much work uses representative-individual models, in which
distributive effects are literally moot.  Yet a concern for distribution is what motivates the
common stipulation that proportional income tax adjustments rather than adjustments to a
uniform grant are the marginal source of finance.  Accordingly, it is natural to ask what the
distributive effects would be if one superimposed the reform and stipulated income tax
adjustment on a model like that examined here in which individuals do vary in income-earning
ability.  In that case, distributive effects may well be present.  Furthermore, the second step of
the decomposition makes apparent that, if the contemplated reforms implicitly increase
(decrease) redistribution, they would be associated with additional (reduced) distortion, which
would make the seemingly optimal commodity tax rate below (above) the Pigouvian level.
Upon examination, some of the prior literature does consider reforms that implicitly
increase redistribution and thus should be expected to involve distortion due to that effect.  For
example, work on pollution quotas (surveyed in Bovenberg and Goulder, 2002) compares
environmental regimes that themselves have different effects on revenue, with any gap made up
by changing marginal income tax rates.  The regimes that raise more revenue are thus less
distortionary, but the distortion reduction is a consequence of reduced use of redistributive
income taxation.  In those models, the other revenue differences have a lump-sum character;
hence, regimes with lower revenue are equivalent to modifications of a linear income tax that
increase the uniform grant financed by an increase in the marginal tax rate, a combination that
obviously raises redistribution as well as distortion.  This characterization is reinforced by
Fullerton’s (1997, p. 248 n.8) explanation of the second-best literature’s weak double-dividend
claim: “if an uncorrected externality is subjected to initial taxation, then welfare is higher if the
revenue is used to reduce other distorting taxes than if it is returned to consumers lump sum.” 
To take a different type of example, Goulder et al. (1999) use a tax adjustment that holds
constant the real purchasing power of the income transfer component of the tax-transfer system. 
This property implies that the full cost of improved environmental protection is borne by richer
individuals, so increased environmental protection is implicitly linked to greater redistribution,
which in turn produces labor supply distortion.
A more broadly applicable yet subtle effect is due to the fact that the curvature of
(sub)utility as a function of consumption is simultaneously related to the slope of the labor
supply curve (see Chetty 2006) and also to the incidence of commodity tax reforms as well as
that of the accompanying benefits from controlling externalities.  Although this connection is not
widely appreciated, the implication is that explicit assumptions about labor supply – typically,
that the labor supply curve is upward sloping – entail implicit assumptions about the distributive
incidence of reforms.
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To illustrate this elusive point, consider the following additively separable utility
function: u(xc, xd, e, l) = (xc.5xd .5)1!ρ/(1!ρ) ! b(e) ! z(l), where xc is a clean good (no
externality), xd is a dirty good (negative externality), and e is total consumption of xd.  (This
utility function exhibits constant relative risk aversion in consumption of ρ; in the limit as ρ
approaches 1, it is appropriate to substitute the log of the value in the first parentheses.)  Suppose
further that there is a single commodity tax τd on xd and that there is a linear income tax with rate
t and a zero intercept (i.e., disposable income is (1!t)wl).  The policy experiment is to raise τd
while simultaneously reducing t to maintain budget balance.  It is possible to show that ρ < 1
(ρ > 1) is associated with all three of the following: labor supply is upward (downward) sloping;
the experiment reduces (increases) labor supply; and the benefit from controlling the externality,
although equal for all types in utils, rises less (more) than proportionately with income when
measured in dollars, which implies that the reform’s overall effect is to increase (reduce)
redistribution.4  If ρ = 1, labor supply is independent of the wage, the experiment has no effect on
labor supply, and the reform is distribution neutral.  Although merely a simple, special case, this
model is close to common ones employed in the literature.  Furthermore, it brings to light a
central point of this article that is not immediately obvious, namely, that distributive effects from
a reform as a whole can arise in subtle ways – even when the benefit of controlling externalities
is additively separable – and that net distributive effects are implicitly related to effects on labor
supply in precisely the manner suggested by step 2 of the decomposition.  That is, additional
labor supply distortion goes hand in hand with greater redistribution.  Indeed, with weak
separability of labor, Lemma 1 demonstrates that this is a general, hard-wired relationship.5
3.3.  Nonseparability
The model also assumes that utility is weakly separable in labor, with the implication that
neither the commodity mix nor the level of particular externalities affects labor effort – only the
total subutility due to commodities and externalities matters.  As is familiar from Corlett and
Hague (1953), if some commodities are substitutes for or complements with labor (leisure),
differential taxes or subsidies tend to be optimal.  In the present setting, the benchmark is not
uniformity but rather Pigouvian differentials.  To illustrate the practical significance of
nonseparability, West and Williams (2007) provide evidence that gasoline consumption is a
leisure complement; accordingly, it is optimal to tax gasoline at a rate above the Pigouvian first-
best level.  (Observe that, even if gasoline consumption involved no negative externalities, it
would still be optimal to tax gasoline above the Pigouvian level (zero) – that is, to impose a
positive differential tax on gasoline – because of its complementarity with leisure.)
It is also possible that externalities themselves interact with labor effort.  For example,
reducing some negative externalities may make outdoor recreation more attractive, in which case
it would be optimal to stop short of the Pigouvian first best.  If, instead, central city ambience is
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improved, which in turn makes work more appealing, then going beyond full internalization
would raise welfare.
Much prior literature on optimal internalization of externalities, like the present paper,
assumes at least weak separability with regard to environmental benefits but, in contrast, does
not assume that private consumption is weakly separable.  Accordingly, some differences in
results are due to this distinction.  As explained, relaxing separability could change the optimum
in either direction, depending on whether, say, a negative-externality-causing good was a leisure
complement (as in West and Williams’s study of gasoline consumption) or a leisure substitute. 
Since prior work more often suggests that optimal taxes are below Pigouvian levels, this
difference could be due in part to an implicit assumption that dirty goods are leisure substitutes.6
4.  Conclusion
This article examines the problem of controlling externalities in a model with commodity
taxes and subsidies as the policy instrument, an income tax (initially set arbitrarily), and a
continuum of individuals whose earning abilities differ.  It considers consumption tax reforms
that involve adjustments to the income tax schedule that in aggregate are distribution neutral
(taking into account both the direct effects of reforms, including on commodity tax revenue and
externalities, and the effects of the income tax adjustments).  Such reforms allow one to set aside
distributive concerns and focus on Pareto improvements.  Moreover, as demonstrated, there is
also no effect on labor supply in the baseline case with separable labor.  Which reforms are
optimal, therefore, depends on what might be viewed as narrow, traditional considerations of
efficiency.
The main result is that setting commodity taxes and subsidies equal to marginal harms
and benefits is optimal.  Distribution-neutral implementation results in a Pareto improvement. 
An extension shows that, with some additional assumptions, marginal reforms in the direction of
the naive first-best also result in Pareto improvements (with distribution-neutral
implementation).  These results suggest that basic first-best principles of internalization provide
a useful focal point that clarifies thinking and assists in the examination of reforms.
The analysis here employs a number of different types of assumptions.  The additional
assumptions for partial reforms pertain to second-best problems that can arise when externalities
are not fully internalized.  (Thus, they were unnecessary in demonstrating Proposition 1.)  These
qualifications are orthogonal to the concerns about distribution and about labor supply distortion
due to the income tax that have been the focus of most second-best work on the control of
externalities: In a world with individualized lump-sum taxes that achieve the desired distribution
without any distortion, the pertinent qualifications indicate that moving commodity taxes in the
direction of (but not all the way to) the first best might not raise welfare.
The assumption of distribution-neutral implementation was examined at length.  It was
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explained that one can analyze the merits of non-distribution-neutral reforms in two steps: first,
with distribution held constant, and then, separately, with regard to redistribution considered in
isolation from the change in the regulation of externalities.  The costs and benefits of changing
redistribution do not depend on the particular reform that instigated such change.  As a
consequence, it probably does not make sense for every policy assessment involving
externalities to incorporate an independent analysis of the equity-efficiency tradeoff that results
when the extent of redistributive income taxation is adjusted.  However, as explained, some
existing work analyzes reforms that implicitly involve increased redistribution, the distortionary
effect of which is not usually distinguished from the welfare consequences inherently associated
with the regulation of externalities.
The inquiry at hand is also related to the literature on optimal commodity taxation in the
presence of an optimal income tax (but without externalities).  That research has identified
numerous other qualifications to Atkinson and Stiglitz’s (1976) uniformity result.7  One that was
examined above involved the assumption of weak separability of labor.  For the most part, these
qualifications are independent of whether the setting involves externalities, and thus most do not
go to the core of the second-best literature on the regulation of externalities in the presence of
income taxation.  The analysis of the present paper thus can be understood as demonstrating a
substantial unity between the pure commodity tax problem and that involving externalities, one
that can be taken advantage of in subsequent research, including that on qualifications to first-
best prescriptions.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2:  Begin with an income tax T(y) and an initial set of τi’s that are
not first-best Pigouvian taxes and subsidies.  Recall that the commodity tax reform to be
considered is a move to τi(α)  = αhi + (1!α)τi, for all i, where α 0 [0, 1].  That is, all commodity
taxes and subsidies are moved the same fraction of the distance toward the simple first-best
Pigouvian scheme under which τi = hi, for all i.8  Furthermore, we are considering a reform
dτi(α)/dα, for all i, evaluated at α = 0.  And the income tax schedule is T(y,α).
The logic of Lemma 1 depends on the fact that T is adjusted to keep utility constant at
every income level (and on weak labor separability), but not on the particular sort of reform
under consideration, so we can proceed straightaway to an analogue of Lemma 2.  Let R(α) be
the revenue raised under commodity tax regime τi(α) where the income tax schedule T(y,α) is
adjusted as described – i.e., R(α) is equal to the left side of expression (3) making the appropriate
substitutions for the commodity tax vector and the income tax schedule.
Lemma 2N: If M2v/MejMxi  = 0, for all i, j, then dR(α)/dα*α=0 > 0.
Proof: Begin by using the budget constraint (1) to form the Lagrangian for each type of
individual.
[ ]( ) ( ) ( ( ), ) ( ( )) ( ( )) .A L u y w T y w p x y wi i i1 = + − − +∑λ α τ α
Because T(y(w),α) is defined to keep utility constant as α changes, it follows that dL/dα = 0 for
each type.  Furthermore, from the analogue to Lemma 1, dl/dα = 0.  Therefore,
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Rearranging terms, expression (A2) is equivalent to
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Observe that the left side of expression (A3) is the contribution to the change in revenue by a
given type of individual, a point to which we will return momentarily.  For the moment, we will
concentrate on the right side.
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An individual’s first-order conditions for the choice of the xi’s are (uv/λ)(Mv/Mxi) =
pi + τi(α), for all i.  Use this to substitute in the first term on the right side of (A3), then combine
that term with the third term, to find that the right side equals
( ) ( ) .A dx
d
u v de
di
i v e ii4 τ α α λ α∑ ∑+
At this point, we can integrate both sides of expression (A3) over the population – first replacing
the right side with expression (A4) – and evaluate at α = 0 to yield
( ) ( ) ( ) .A dR
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h de
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To explain expression (A5), first, for the left side, simply compare the left side of expression
(A3), when integrated, to the left side of expression (3) – or to expression (5), which gives the
change in revenue for a discrete reform.  After the first equal sign, the first component in moving
from (A4) makes use of the definition in expression (2) of the ei’s as the integral of the xi’s over
the population, and the second component in moving from (A4) uses the definition of the hi’s
from expression (4).  Finally, in moving to the right side of the second equal sign, the
substitution follows from the definition of the proportional commodity tax reform, τi(α)  =
αhi + (1!α)τi, for all i, evaluated at α = 0.
The right side of expression (A5) must be positive, on account of what is referred to as
the (Hicksian) compensated law of demand, which follows directly from application of the weak
axiom of revealed preference.  To explain how this property applies to expression (A5), first note
that dτi(α)/dα in the present setting is the change in the price for commodity i faced by
consumers (since producer prices are taken to be constant).  Next, observe that dei/dα is the
change in aggregate consumption for commodity i.  The reform under consideration, however,
differs from the pure textbook case of a change in prices because of the presence of externalities. 
Specifically, as noted in subsection 3.1, it is possible in principle that the change in levels of
externalities could affect individuals’ consumption choices.  However, we have assumed that
M2v/MejMxi  = 0, for all i, j.  Finally, the compensated law of demand requires that the change in
price vector under consideration be utility-compensated, but we have defined T(wl,α) to
accomplish just that.  Therefore, the compensated law of demand holds for each individual and
thus it holds when aggregated over the population.  This, in turn, implies that the right side of
expression (A5) is positive.9
Kaplow.EnvTax.IFS.110  January 4, 2010
10There is no revenue effect analogous to that in stage 2 of the proof of Lemma 2 because here we consider a
marginal change, and the envelope theorem applies to individuals’ consumption adjustments.
- 20 -
  The intuition underlying the last step in the argument of Lemma 2N is related to the
discussion in subsection 3.1, which suggested that individuals’ shifts in consumption would be
toward those commodities for which taxes fall and away from those for which taxes rise. 
Although this phenomenon need not be true for every commodity (because commodities may be
substitutes for or complements with other commodities), it must be true in the aggregate for each
individual.
Further intuition may be gleaned from the intermediate expression in (A5).  It states that
the net revenue effect constitutes the difference between the commodity tax rate and marginal
external harm, times the change in quantity, for each commodity.10  The latter, marginal harm,
will equal the amount of the compensatory income tax adjustment on account of externalities. 
Thus, not surprisingly, the net revenue effect is the difference between what is collected on
account of each commodity by the commodity tax on that commodity and what must be paid
through the income tax due to changes in external harm associated with that commodity.  This
effect can be unambiguously signed because of the nature of the particular reform under
consideration: The definition of the reform is used in the proof of the lemma in moving from the
middle to the right side of expression (A5), the latter of which, as explained, must be positive as
a consequence of individuals’ maximizing behavior.
To complete the argument, all that remains is to rebate the surplus to produce a Pareto
improvement.  This step, however, involves the further complication noted in the text, requiring
that we further assume that “more is better for everyone.”  At this point, we have established
Proposition 2.
Proof of Proposition 3:  Begin the analysis with any non-first-best commodity tax and
subsidy system {τ1, ..., τn}, T(y) and consider any commodity tax reform τi*.  As in the proofs of
Propositions 1 and 2, define an intermediate regime with income tax schedule T°(y) that has the
property that, if all individuals (of every type w) continue to choose the same level of labor effort
as under the initial tax system, then their utility will be unchanged.  Lemma 1, stating that labor
effort is indeed unchanged, once again holds because, as previously noted, the analysis depends
only on the manner in which T°(y) is constructed (and weak separability).
It is now straightforward to show that a version of Lemma 2 holds.
Lemma 2O: A commodity tax reform {τ1*, ..., τn*}, T°(y) raises more revenue than
regime {τ1, ..., τn}, T(y) if and only if it is an efficiency-increasing commodity tax reform (i.e.,
expression (9) holds).
Proof: For each of the budget constraints (1) for these two regimes, integrate them over
the population of types, subtract one from the other, and rearrange terms, to yield:
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The first bracketed term on the left side of expression (A6) is total revenue under the
intermediate regime, and the second bracketed term is total revenue under the initial regime. 
The right side is positive if and only if expression (9), the definition of an efficiency-increasing
commodity tax reform, holds.
Accordingly, we can complete the argument as before, which establishes Proposition 3.
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